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Abstract
Humans can not only perform some visual tasks with great precision, they can also judge
how good they are in these tasks. However, it remains unclear how observers produce such
metacognitive evaluations, and how these evaluations might be dissociated from the perfor-
mance in the visual task. Here, we hypothesized that some stimulus variables could affect
confidence judgments above and beyond their impact on performance. In a motion categori-
zation task on moving dots, we manipulated the mean and the variance of the motion direc-
tions, to obtain a low-mean low-variance condition and a high-mean high-variance condition
with matched performances. Critically, in terms of confidence, observers were not indiffer-
ent between these two conditions. Observers exhibited marked preferences, which were
heterogeneous across individuals, but stable within each observer when assessed one
week later. Thus, confidence and performance are dissociable and observers’ confidence
judgments put different weights on the stimulus variables that limit performance.
Introduction
Some choices are easy and some are not. We seem to have a sense of this difference: sometimes
we are confident and sometimes we are not. This feeling of confidence matters because it tells
us whether we are ready to commit to the decision, or whether we should collect more informa-
tion to avoid making a mistake. However, how we make such confidence judgments and which
variables contribute to these judgments, is still unclear even in simple perceptual tasks. In this
domain, confidence is usually positively correlated with choice accuracy (e.g. [1–6]), and
neurophysiological data seems to support the common coding of choice probability and confi-
dence ([7]). However, the two can also be dissociated, as evidenced in several recent studies
([8–13]).
Here, we investigate how observers make such confidence judgments during a 2-choice per-
ceptual categorization task, where two factors can be dissociated that contribute to perfor-
mance: signal strength and signal reliability ([14]). On the one hand, the stimulus to be
categorized can be located far from the category boundary (on easy trials) or near to it (on diffi-
cult trials). On the other hand, the stimulus can be presented with high noise (low reliability)
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or low noise (high reliability). In psychophysical terms, signal strength reflects the stimulus po-
sition on the x-axis of the psychometric curve relative to the point of subjective equality, where-
as signal reliability corresponds to the slope of the psychometric curve.
By manipulating simultaneously these two factors, we can assess whether confidence judg-
ments are sensitive to the expected level of performance only, or whether it is biased in addition
by signal strength or reliability, above and beyond their effects on performance (i.e. signal-to-
noise ratio). For instance, an observer might notice that the noise level differs between two con-
ditions and overreact to this difference, by reporting greater confident in the low noise condi-
tion even if performance is made identical between the two conditions.
In the present study, we used a motion categorization task on randomly moving dots, whose
directions followed a circular Gaussian (i.e. von Mises) distribution of which we experimentally
controlled the mean (and thereby the signal strength) and the variance (and thus the reliabili-
ty). Critically, we used two levels of variability (high vs. low) and we equated these two condi-
tions in performance by adjusting the mean direction separately for high and low levels of
variability. The perceptual task was embedded in a confidence comparison procedure, in which
the observer indicates after two trials of the perceptual task which one was associated with the
greatest confidence ([4–6]). This procedure allowed us to ask participants to directly compare
their confidence between two conditions, a high-strength low-reliability and a low-strength
high-reliability, which were matched in performance.
Methods
Participants
Fifteen adults (age range 18–30) were recruited from the French RISC database (http://www.
risc.cnrs.fr). They all reported normal or corrected vision, and were naïve with respect to the
goal of the study. Three additional participants were tested but discarded from all the analyses
reported here, because they showed extreme behavior (distance> 3SD from the mean), two in
terms of poor perceptual performance, and one for an extreme bias in the confidence task. Par-
ticipants received 20 euros after their participation in two sessions in the study.
Ethics statement
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants before the experiment. Because
the research involved negligible risks and no nominative/identifying information was collected,
ethics approval was not required and no IRB was consulted before conducting the study. No
health information was collected from participants other than eye sight and age.
Stimuli and notations
On each trial, two random-dots kinematograms (RDK) were presented simultaneously within
circular aperatures (radius 4°), at 5° eccentricity on the left and right side of a central fixation
point. Both contained motion approximately toward the center. This arrangement was pre-
ferred over one central stimulus, in order to eliminate automatic pursuit eye-movements. Both
RDK contained 50 dots (radius 0.15°) whose motion directions on each frame were drawn
from a von Mises distribution, which we specify here by 2 parameters:m, the offset of the mean
motion direction relative to the horizontal motion towards the center, and v, the variance of
the distribution (equivalent to the inverse of the concentration parameter of the von Mises dis-
tribution), with bothm and v experimentally controlled (see design section below). The dura-
tion of the stimulus was 200ms (12 frames at 60Hz). We smoothed visual transients at stimulus
onset and offset by using a linear ramp in contrast for the two initial frames and two final
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frames of the stimulus. Individual dots were randomly repositioned within the circular frame
every 83ms (5 frames at 60Hz). At each frame, 20% of the dots were repositioned. Motion
speed was constant (4° per sec). Stimuli were presented using Matlab (Mathworks, Inc.) and
Psychtoolbox ([15–16]) on a 17” monitor with resolution 1024 x 768 at 60Hz, viewed at a
57cm distance.
Task
There were two tasks, a first order perceptual task and a second order confidence task. For the
first order perceptual task, participants had to press the left-arrow key when the left RDK
moved slightly upward and the right RDK slightly downward (m>0), and the right-arrow key
for the opposite pattern (m<0) (see Fig. 1). Participants were not encouraged to respond fast;
their response triggered the next trial after a delay. Trial-by-trial feedback was delivered during
a training phase (10 minutes), after which the confidence comparison task was introduced:
after two trials, participants now had to indicate which of the two perceptual decisions was as-
sociated with greater confidence (“which was most likely to be correct”). No feedback was
given during the main experiment, which lasted approximately 80 minutes.
Design
Across trials, the variance parameter v was either low or high, taking values corresponding to
standard deviations of 5° and 25° respectively. For each variance level, we varied the parameter
m using staircase procedures (weighted 1-up 1-down) to maintain response probabilities for
both left and right choices in the motion task at around 75% in one session and 80% in the
other session. The second session occurred one week after the first session. Each pair of two tri-
als contained one high variance and one low variance stimulus, randomly ordered, to be com-
pared during the confidence comparison task. In each session, participants completed 560
pairs of trials.
Fig 1. Experimental paradigm. Top: schematic representation of the stimulus and response categories. Bottom: timeline representation of a pair of first
order trial, followed by a confidence comparison judgment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120870.g001
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Analyses
We quantified the motion categorization performance via psychometric curves, in which the
proportion of left choices (noted PL) where described as a function of the stimulus parameter
m (Fig. 2). The psychometric curve was fitted by a cumulative Gaussian with 2 parameters: a
criterion c corresponding to the point of subjective equality between the two possible re-
sponses, and an internal noise parameter σ (EQ1). Fits were performed using maximum likeli-
hood on the trial-by-trial data (bins in Fig. 2 are plotted only for illustrative purposes). These
psychometric analyses were carried out separately for low and high stimulus variance.
PLðmÞ ¼
Z1
x¼0
1
s
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p e12 xðmcÞsð Þ
2
ðEQ1Þ
We report motion categorization thresholds (noted θ) as the half-distance between the two
values of m for which the observer responded left in 75% of trials (PL(m) = 0.75) and right in
75% of trials (PL(m) = 0.25), on the basis of the ﬁtted curves. In order to assess the relation be-
tween conﬁdence and performance (Fig. 2), we also calculated the psychometric curves
Fig 2. Effects of stimulus variance and reported confidence on performance. (A) Psychometric curves for one observer in one session, calculated
separately for the 2 stimulus variances (red vs. blue) and the 2 confidence judgments (full vs. dotted). Dots represent binned data, lines represent fitted
cumulative Gaussians. (B) Motion categorization thresholds averaged across observers, and over the two sessions, for the different conditions. Dots and
error bars represent the mean and SEM of thresholds, across participants.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120870.g002
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separately for trials associated with higher vs. lower conﬁdence according to the conﬁdence
comparison judgment, as in previous work (e.g. [6]).
In subsequent analyses, we used this notion of threshold to quantify the signal-to-noise
ratio of the stimuli, by considering for each stimulus the value S defined in EQ2, wherem is the
stimulus parameter, c is the point of subjective equality, and θ is the categorization threshold as
defined from the psychometric curve (EQ1). Note that we obtained distinct values of c and θ
for the two levels of stimulus variance. The quantity S captures both the influence of signal
strength (captured by the numerator |m-c|) and signal reliability (captured by the denominator
θ) on performance.
S ¼ jm c
y
j ðEQ2Þ
Results
Perceptual performance and confidence
Motion categorization thresholds, quantifying performance in the perceptual task (see
Fig. 2A), were subjected to a repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) with session,
stimulus variance (low vs. high), and confidence (lower vs. greater) as within participants fac-
tors. The corresponding data is presented in Fig. 2B. The analysis revealed two significant main
effects. First, performance was higher (threshold was lower) for lower stimulus variance (F
(1,14) = 51.46, p<0.001; mean θ: 4.84° vs. 3.51°), as expected. Second, performance increased
with confidence (F(1,14) = 30.60, p<0.001; mean θ: 5.26° vs 3.08°), indicating that participants’
confidence comparison responses could capture some information about their internal noise.
Additionally, a significant interaction between reported confidence and stimulus variance was
found (F(1,14) = 9.81, p = 0.007), by which the variance effect was less pronounced in high
confidence trials. No other effects or interactions were significant. In particular, motion catego-
rization thresholds did not improve significantly over sessions, suggesting that participants had
reached a relatively constant regime after the training in the first session.
We note that the stimuli may have differed between variance conditions (due to our stair-
case procedure) or confidence conditions (due to participants’ confidence being influenced by
the stimuli), as reported in S1 File and S1 Fig. Crucially however, by considering the whole psy-
chometric curve our approach allows us to estimate the effects of confidence (and of variance)
on performance above and beyond these variations of the stimuli. This is illustrated by the fact
that in Fig. 2A, we can see that identical stimuli (identical locations on the x-axis) were associ-
ated with better performance when participants reported higher confidence compared to
lower confidence.
Confidence biases for signal mean and variance
Our initial hypothesis was that observers would be less confident during high variance trials
compared to low variance trials, even when the two trials are equalized in terms of performance
(higher v being compensated by higherm parameter). To test this simply, we selected pairs of
trials for which the strength of the stimuli (that is, how it deviates from the point of subjective
equality, in threshold units) were roughly identical in the two trials (difference less than 1
threshold unit). We expected that in these pairs observers might be more confident in the low
variance stimulus, as if stimulus variability should deteriorate confidence more than
performance itself.
Mean and Variability during Confidence
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Overall, we found no such bias at the group level: for matched difficulty levels, some partici-
pants indicated higher confidence for the high variance stimulus while some felt more confi-
dent for low variance stimuli (Fig. 3A). Strikingly however, these individual profiles were stable
and consistent over the two sessions, as indicated by a strong correlation of observers’ biases
(r = 0.69, p = 0.004) between the two sessions. In other words, some observers systematically
favored signals with a greater mean parameter, while others favored lower variance signals. In
both cases, confidence was affected by the physical stimulus parameters above and beyond
their effects on accuracy.
Two further analyses confirmed that this pattern was not driven by one participant showing
heavy biases in both sessions (bottom-left datapoint of Fig. 3A). First, rerunning the correlation
without the most extreme point provided almost identical results (r = 0.53, p = 0.054). Second,
a robust regression analysis also confirmed a significant relation between the two biases mea-
sured in the two sessions (regression coefficient = 0.43, p = 0.03).
We then anticipated that these variance-related biases on confidence could be more pro-
nounced in observers for whom stimulus variability had greater impact on performance. We
thus calculated the amplitude of this variance bias on confidence (i.e. its distance to 50%) and
the relative effect of variance on perceptual categorization thresholds (i.e. the difference in
threshold between high and low variance, divided by their average), averaged across the two
sessions. As anticipated, these two quantities indeed correlated across observers (r = 0.66,
p = 0.007). The more variance affected performance, the more it biased confidence, in one di-
rection or the other.
Predicting confidence comparison using logistic regression
To take a different angle on these results, we carried out a logistic regression (EQ3) in which
the probability that the observer reported greater confidence in the first trial of the pair, P
(C1>C2), was predicted from three quantities. First, a constant term with weight β1 measured
the overall tendency of the observer in this confidence comparison task. Second, we quantified
using threshold units (EQ2) the signal-to-noise ratio of the stimuli in the two trials, noted S1
and S2, and we used their difference as a predictor with weight β2 in the regression. Third, to
Fig 3. Effects of stimulus variance on confidence. In both panels each point is an individual observer. (A)
The percentage of equal performance pairs in which the low variance stimulus was associated with higher
confidence, calculated separately for session 1 and session 2. Individual estimates are aligned on the
diagonal, showing that they were consistent across the two sessions. (B) The more the stimulus variance
affected performance (x-axis: threshold elevation), the more it affected confidence (y-axis: amplitude, i.e.
deviation from 50%, of the mean bias).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120870.g003
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capture more formally the variance-related bias reported above, we included a predictor with
weight β3, that coded whether the low variance or the high variance stimulus was presented
first. This logistic regression was estimated for each participant and session. We report for each
parameter the mean estimate across the two sessions, and the correlation between the two ses-
sions to evaluate stability in time of the parameter estimates. The results of this analysis are pre-
sented Fig. 4.
logitðPðC1 > C2ÞÞ ¼ b1 þ b2  ðS1  S2Þ þ b3  sgnð1=s1  1=s2Þ ðEQ3Þ
Overall, participants reported being more confident in the first trial of the pair (β1:
mean = 0.30, SD = 0.38, T(14) = 3.04, p = 0.009), and this bias was stable across the two ses-
sions (r = 0.75, p = 0.004). This bias could occur at the response or decision level, or it could in-
dicate a real effect of time, by which observers might feel more confident in earlier trials. The
regression also revealed a significant relation between confidence and signal-to-noise ratio (β2:
mean = 0.43, SD = 0.12, T(14) = 13.26, p<0.001), which might constitute a measure of the
Fig 4. Logistic regression for confidence. (A) The metacognitive regression curve for one participant,
plotting confidence comparison responses (in probability, y-axis) against differences in signal-to-noise ratios
between the two trials to be compared (threshold units, x-axis). Large dots are real data, binned along the x-
axis variable. Aligned small dots are regression fits. Trial pairs in which the low variance stimulus was
presented first (resp. second) are presented in black (resp. gray). (B) Parameter estimates for the logistic
regression (EQ1). Small dots represent for each participant the average estimate of the parameter across the
two sessions. Big dots and error bars represent the mean and SEM at the group level. (C) Stability of
parameter estimates across the two sessions, one week apart. For each predicting variable, we plotted the
beta coefficient measured on the second session against the value on the first session, and report the
correlation between the two sessions. Error bars represent the standard errors for each parameter estimate.
Cross-sessions correlations are reported along with their significance (** p<0.01, *** p<0.001).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120870.g004
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metacognitive sensitivity of the observer. Of note, this sensitivity parameter did not seem to be
stable in time (r = 0.30, p = 0.28). Finally, the variance-related bias exhibited a heterogeneous
distribution across participants (β3: mean = −0.03, SD = 0.25, T(14) = −0.43, p = 0.67), stable
across the two sessions (r = 0.80, p<0.001), which confirmed our initial results in a more for-
mal manner. Note that, as before, this cross-session stability was also evident when the extreme
datapoint was removed (r = 0.63, p = 0.015), or when a robust regression was used (regression
coefficient = 0.72, p = 0.0017).
Discussion
In the present study, we used a motion categorization task, and we manipulated two variables
to limit observers’ performances: signal strength (more precisely the proximity of the signal to
the category boundary) and signal reliability. In addition to the perceptual task, observers had
to perform a confidence comparison task and indicate which of the last two trials was associat-
ed with the greater confidence. We report two main findings.
Firstly, we found that observers’ confidence judgments were positively correlated with per-
formance, as previous studies have shown. Here, we obtained this positive relation in two dis-
tinct ways. A direct regression analysis showed that confidence increased with stimulus
strength measured in threshold units, i.e. signal-to-noise ratio. Moreover, when we estimated
categorization thresholds for higher confidence and lower confidence trials separately, we
found better performance (i.e. lower categorization thresholds) when confidence was higher.
Our second result is that confidence was not based exclusively on performance or signal-to-
noise ratio. Indeed, when comparing a low-mean low-variance condition and a high-mean
high-variance condition that were matched in terms of performance, observers were not indif-
ferent but they had marked preferences in terms of confidence for one condition over the
other. Surprisingly, these preferences turned out to be different for different observers: some
observers reported higher confidence for the “high-mean high-variance” condition and others
favored the “low-variance low-mean” condition. In other words, when assessing confidence,
some individuals seem to put more weight on the fact that the mean signal is far from the cate-
gory boundary, while other individuals put more weight on the variability being low. These in-
dividual preferences were remarkably stable across time, and replicated in a second session one
week after the first session. This result was obtained in two ways, firstly by analyzing a selection
of trial pairs showing matched performance, and secondly by evaluating the bias across the
whole dataset using a regression approach. This stability is important as it allows us to con-
clude that the individual differences we report reveal distinct individual profiles across the pop-
ulation, rather than random fluctuations due to sampling or estimation error.
The inter-individual variability we found in our study contrasts with a recent study by Zyl-
berberg and colleagues ([13]) in which higher stimulus variability was systematically accompa-
nied by lower accuracy but higher confidence. As shown previously ([9]), this counterintuitive
result can be explained by a model based on signal detection theory ([17]), with the additional
and critical assumption of a “unique criterion constraint” ([18]), by which the observer uses
the same set of decision and confidence criteria across the two experimental conditions. In this
model, the observer receives an observation sample randomly drawn from a normal distribu-
tion whose variance corresponds to internal noise, and compares this sample with a fixed set of
criteria to produce a response and a confidence judgment. When the variance of the samples is
greater, more samples hit extreme ratings and produce higher confidence judgments.
We note that in our study, some participants showed the same profile and reported greater
confident in the higher variability trial than in the lower variability trial (at equal performance
levels). Their data might be modelled along the same lines, by relying on the “unique criterion
Mean and Variability during Confidence
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constraint” as previously shown (e.g. [9]). Critically however, other participants in our study
reported lower confidence in the high variability trial than in the low variability trial, which re-
quires further discussion. At the very least, it appears that these participants have not been lim-
ited by the “unique criterion constraint” (which is not ideal and need not be ubiquitous), and
that they could adjust their criteria to the variation of internal noise.
One more general view might be proposed, according to which all participants try to adjust
their decision and confidence criteria to the level of internal noise that they have to estimate in
every trial. From a Bayesian perspective, this estimation of the noise variance in the current
trial relies both on the current sensory information and on a prior belief about the noise vari-
ance. Thus, the inter-individual profiles we found in our study could be related to the abilities
of different observers to estimate optimally the noise level. For instance, overconfidence or
underconfidence in a particular condition can derive from the underestimation or the overesti-
mation of the noise variance in the prior belief (see e.g. [19]).
In any case, the reasons why these inter-individual differences occurred in our study, but
not in other studies (e.g. [9, 13]), remain to be clarified, but the stimuli or the procedure (e.g.
the use of confidence ratings vs. confidence comparison) might have played a role in this issue.
One could speculate that these inter-individual differences relate to the prior beliefs about the
noise variance, or to the sensory sensitivity to motion variability or motion deviations. It is also
possible that they relate to more cognitive phenomena like misperception of statistical variabil-
ity ([20]), distortions in subjective probability weighting ([21]), or attitudes towards risk. In
any case, past research has demonstrated that such individual differences do provide an inter-
esting leverage when investigating choice behavior and metacognitive abilities, both from a be-
havioral and a neuroscientific perspective (e.g. [22–24]).
The question of how observers make confidence judgments has inspired several computa-
tional models in the recent years. Critically, all these models are based on the same assumption
that confidence and performance rely on the exact same evidence (e.g. in Type 2 SDT [25–27];
etc.) or on the same type of evidence (e.g. [2,28]). By contrast, our work was inspired by the
possibility that confidence and performance might be dissociated, and based on distinct quan-
tities. We note that our approach is not dissimilar to cue utilization theories previously intro-
duced in the domain of metamemory, stating that the cues used by the observer to judge
confidence might be dissociated from performance in the memory task (e.g. [29–32]).
To conclude, by acknowledging explicitly that confidence might rely on other cues than per-
formance, one opens the way for testing candidate variables that might potentially affect confi-
dence but not performance. Delineating these variables would then inform computational
efforts to understand the mechanisms of decision making and confidence judgments. We
might anticipate that the set of such candidate variables is potentially very large, and contains
variables related to the stimulus itself (e.g. evidence reliability, stimulus visibility, the presence
of a visual mask surrounding the stimulus, etc.), variables related to the choice process (e.g. the
response time, the number of alternatives, the potential rewards and stakes, etc.), variables re-
lated to the global environment in which the stimulus and response are embedded (relation
with the past trials, the task load and distractions, etc.), and variables inherent to the observer
(e.g. mood, stress, pain, etc.).
Supporting Information
S1 Fig. Staircase parameters. Distance between the left and right position of the staircase, av-
eraged across trials. Dots are mean and error bars are SEM across participants. The left and
right panels correspond to the ‘hard’ session and ‘easy’ session (see S1 File), respectively.
(EPS)
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S1 File. Staircase analyses.We report here analyses of the staircase parameters
across conditions.
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